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The Financial Crisis and Mandatory 
Pension Systems in Developing 
Countries 
Short- and medium-term responses for retirement income systems 
he international financial crisis has severely 
affected the value of pension fund assets 
worldwide.  The unfolding global recession will 
also impose pressures on public pension schemes 
financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, while limiting the 
capacity of governments to mitigate both of theses 
effects.  Governments are reacting to these events in 
different ways. Some are asking whether the balance 
between funded defined-contribution and unfunded 
pension schemes should be reconsidered.  A few 
have already taken actions to reverse prior reforms.  
This note discusses the potential impacts of the 
financial crisis on fully funded and pay-as-you-go 
retirement-income systems in World Bank client 
countries, and identifies key short- and medium-term 
policy responses.  The note does not go into depth 
on the issues identified.  Stand-alone technical notes 
will be prepared subsequently.  This note itself will 
be updated and refined as new issues emerge.  
The main messages from the note can be 
summarized as follows: 
Abrupt policy changes in response to the 
immediate circumstances should be avoided.  
Pension systems are designed to function over long 
time periods.  Poorly designed short term responses 
to relatively rare events can potentially have negative 
long-term consequences on the capacity of pension 
systems to reliably provide adequate levels of 
retirement income. 
It is important to observe that only a small 
number of retiring individuals are affected by 
the crisis.  Targeted measures can be considered to 
mitigate the losses in their savings and the value of 
their pensions.  
The current crisis strengthens the need for 
diversified multi-pillar pension systems.  These 
allow for a better diversification of risks and thus 
provide better protection to individuals who may be 
vulnerable to the kind of economic shocks now 
being experienced. 
Increasing attention should be paid to 
managing the exposure of individuals to short 
term financial risks in funded systems.  
Strengthening the management of exposure can 
be achieved through both default portfolios 
designed for workers nearing retirement age and also 
the development of phased transitions to the payout 
of benefits that limit the impact of short term 
financial volatility.  
 
The impact of the financial crisis on 
funded defined-contribution pensions 
The impact of the financial crisis on individuals 
participating in funded defined-contribution schemes 
depends on four main factors: (i) changes in asset 
prices and the potential recovery over the medium 
term; (ii) the proportion of pension wealth that is 
supported by funded individual account assets; (iii) 
the presence of minimum social pensions or 
guarantees that are integrated into the pension system; 
and (iv) the requirement and framework for 
mandatory annuitization of the accumulated balance 
at retirement.  
Losses in asset values over the last 12 months reported by 
pension funds have been considerable.  In client countries 
with funded systems these losses have ranged 
between 8% and 50% (Table 1).  While the losses are 
disturbing to plan members over the short term, they 
should not be taken as an indicator of the overall 
longer term performance of the funds which is the 
relevant perspective for any pension system.  Indeed, 
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from 1994 through 2007, in 13 countries for which 
data is available, the mandatory pension funds 
experienced an annual real rate of return of 6% per 
year (Figure 1).  In Chile, for instance, even with the 
losses observed up to August of this year, real returns 
for 2002-2008 ranged between 3% to 10% a year 
depending on the type of portfolio. (AFP, 2008).   
 
Table 1:  Real Returns of Mandatory Pension Funds  
(year-on-year) 
Growth Balanced Conservative
Chile 13-Oct -46.1 -23.1 0
Mexico 30-Sept -8.3 -6 -0.5
Peru 10-Oct -47.8 -33.9 -14.5
Uruguay 30-Sept -7.5
Croatia 30-Oct -14.1
Estonia 15-Oct -30.5 -20.9 -9.7
Hungary 15-Oct -35 -18
Lithuania 15-Oct -48.4 -32.6 -9.4
Poland 30-Sept -17.4
Slovak Republic 13-Oct -12.4 -10.3 -2  
  Source:  Bank staff.  
 
Figure 1: Long Term Pension Fund Returns 
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Note:  For countries where the reform was implemented after 1994 (e.g., 
Croatia) the rate of return is from the point of inception.   
Source:  Bebczuk and Musalem (2009)  
 
Most countries with mandatory funded pensions have multi-
pillar systems in which funded individual accounts form only 
part of the overall retirement package.  In a majority of 
countries, the pension individuals receive also has a 
defined-benefit component and often there are 
minimum pension guarantees (see below).  All of the 
countries in Eastern Europe/Central Asia (ECA) 
except Kazakhstan that introduced funded schemes 
maintained a defined-benefit system as well.  In 
Lithuania and Hungary, for example, less than 30% 
of the retirement benefit package for retirees today 
comes from financial assets in individual accounts.  
Retirement-income systems that are more exposed 
to the financial crisis include those of Chile, El 
Salvador, Mexico and Peru, where defined-benefit 
pension systems were eliminated and the majority of 
retirement incomes will come from funded defined 
contribution pensions (Figure 2).  In Mexico, 
however, the government guaranteed that overall 
pensions under the new system would be at least as 
large as those under the pre-reform pay-as-you-go 
scheme for people already covered.  The impact of 
the declines in asset values in Mexico will therefore 
be compensated for persons who retire before asset 
values recover.   
 
 Figure 2:  Role of Financial Assets in the Retirement 
Package 
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Note: calculations are based on weighted average pension wealth and are 
for full-career workers.  See OECD (2007) and D’Addio, Seisdedos and 
Whitehouse (2008). 
Source: APEX model and Whitehouse (2007). 
 
Many countries also provide social pensions or offer minimum 
pension guarantees.  The main objective of these 
provisions is to prevent poverty during old-age.  
They are part of contributory or non-contributory 
(zero-pillar) systems.  The average value of these 
benefits across countries for which information is 
available is around 30% of the average economy-
wide earnings (Figure 3).  As a result, even where 
pensions are heavily exposed to fluctuations in the 
value of financial assets, in many cases minimum 
pension guarantees shield lower-income workers 
from poverty.  Of course declines in asset prices can 
still materially reduce retirement benefits. 
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. Figure 3:  Minimum Pension Guarantees  
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Source: Staff calculations, Robalino et al. (2005), and Whitehouse (2007)  
 
Only a small number of workers will retire during the period 
in which their pensions would be reduced due to the decline in 
asset values.  Those workers facing the most 
important recent decline in their pension benefit are 
those who have to retire in the midst of the crisis and, 
in particular, those who are mandated to transform 
their accumulated retirement savings into an annuity.  
Most of the countries with mandatory funded 
systems have established these during the last twenty 
years and typically included only workers who were 
more than 20 years from the normal retirement age.  
Although some permitted older workers to also 
switch into the funded system, except in a few 
countries, the rates for older workers were not very 
high.  Therefore there are relatively few individuals 
with a large reliance in a funded account who will be 
retiring in the short term.  
The situation varies between regions.  In the 
countries of Eastern and Central Europe and Asia 
(ECA) that reformed their systems beginning in the 
early 1990’s the full cohorts will retire in 15 or more 
years and partial cohorts in 4 years (see Annex).  In 
Latin America, where reforms occurred earlier the 
situation is different as funded pillars already affect 
workers retiring now (see Annex). But even in these 
cases there is a minority of plan members who are 
affected.  For instance, in the case of Chile, the 
country with the oldest funded pillar, only 5% of 
plan members have to retire in the next 5 years and 
many other countries have a far lower percentage.  
In addition, some funded systems have established 
multiple portfolios that include conservative options 
that are primarily invested in short term government 
debt.  Although these portfolios provide a relatively 
lower rate of return, they shield plan members from 
most of the losses in asset values.  In Chile, which 
introduced the multiple funds in 2002, older workers 
are limited to the more conservative funds one of 
which is a default option if they make no other 
choice.  As a result 80% of the members within 5 
years of retirement age are invested in one of the 
two most conservative portfolios and have been 
largely shielded from losses. Although small in 
number, however, if these retiring workers are 
severely affected it will have a potentially important 
influence on the way in which the reformed 
pensions are perceived and a political influence well 
beyond the economic impact and so will likely need 
to be addressed in some manner. 
 
Are defined-benefit pay-as-you-go 
pensions affected as well? 
Earnings related pay-as-you-go pension systems will 
be affected in a less dramatic and immediate way as 
the economic downturn reduces their stream of 
revenue and potentially increases benefit claims.  
Indeed, the emerging global recession will reduce 
contribution revenue in most countries as a result of 
decrease in employment or reductions in the level of 
earnings on which contributions are levied.  In 
addition, pension expenditures from such schemes 
will likely increase as more individuals retire from 
the labor force and seek pension benefits in the face 
of an economic downturn.  Disability claims can also 
increase in response to higher unemployment. 
The extent of the financial impact depends significantly on the 
maturity of the scheme.   Countries which will face the 
greatest fiscal pressures are those where financial 
flows from contributions and investments are less 
than current expenditures, and those where liquid 
reserves could face the greatest fiscal pressures.  
Examples of countries in this situation include: 
Azerbaijan, Brazil, Egypt, Morocco, Russia, Serbia, 
and Tunisia.  Those countries in a less frail financial 
situation will need to reduce cash balances 
temporarily and/or draw on reserves.  However, it 
should be possible to repair the effects once the 
crisis has passed.   
The effects on members will depend on how governments deal 
with the shortfall in revenues.  They could finance 
pension-scheme deficits in full.  Alternatively, they 
might partially default on pension promises, by 
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delaying pension payments or failing to index 
benefits, for example.  The balance between the two 
options will be politically determined as pensions are 
just one of a range of competing demands for 
limited public resources. The main difficulties will be 
observed in countries that have overall fiscal deficits 
and rely on external debt financing that has become 
increasing difficult to refinance with the global credit 
crunch.   
In some cases (as recently occurred in Argentina) countries 
that have introduced funded second pillars may be tempted to 
re-allocate the portion of the social insurance contributions that 
previously went to pay-as-you-go schemes back to the public 
schemes. Although this might address short term cash 
flow issues, it does not improve the overall public 
net-liability position, and it risks having negative 
long term consequences on the individual benefit 
position.  In addition to diminishing the 
diversification of the overall retirement system and 
placing workers at the risk of future benefit 
reductions if the system can not remain viable over 
the long term with the increased liabilities, this will 
also close funded account when asset values are low, 
locking in losses and precluding members from the 
opportunity to benefit from any recovery in prices. 
 
Short-term responses  
In the short-term, governments are advised not to 
overreact to current economic conditions and to 
carefully analyze the full consequences of policy 
responses in the context of the long-term planning 
horizon relevant for pensions.  Three general 
recommendations are made.  
First, governments should avoid short-term reform reversals 
that have not been properly assessed and that may come at a 
high price for future retirees.  Reverting workers more 
than five years from retirement to a pay as you go 
system may be attractive and politically expedient.  
However, this implies that government would be 
reinstating an implicit pension liability with the pay-
as-you-go system (in exchange for the assets they 
borrow now) and that will need to be financed in the 
future.  Limiting contributions to funded systems in 
the current period will also deny members the 
opportunity to receive higher pensions in the future.  
This is particularly true now when plan members 
could purchase assets at relatively low prices and 
thus accrue large potential gains.   
Similarly, moving asset allocations to what are 
perceived as more secure instruments such as short 
term government debt may placate members with 
diminishing accounts but will severely limit the 
opportunities for higher retirement benefits.  
Analysis of historical patterns in the asset markets of 
developed countries demonstrates that, despite 
significant variation in rates or return due to market 
volatility, a diversified portfolio of assets would 
result in a higher level of retirement savings over 
nearly all time periods (see Munnell, Webb, and 
Golub-Sass, 2008). 
Secondly, governments should recognize that the current 
financial crisis is a rare “extreme” event.  As such, it 
requires temporary measures to deal with the effects 
of the crisis rather than structural changes in policy. 
Moreover, any compensation arrangements that may 
be considered need to be carefully designed.  Once 
established these could be very difficult to eliminate 
even when conditions no longer warrant them.  
Thirdly, governments should not underestimate the potential 
positive effects that long term institutional investors (such as 
pension funds) can have on the financial system enterprise 
financing, and ultimately employment and growth.  
Countries with well-developed, regulated and 
supervised pension funds (such as Chile) have been 
able to weather past shocks much better as the 
purchase of commercial bonds partially 
compensated for reduced access to Bank loans. 
There is emerging evidence that pension funds are 
moving into loan markets previously dominated by 
commercial and investment banks (such as in the 
Netherlands). 
The following short-term measures should be 
considered: 
• Establishing a public information campaign to explain 
the situation to members of funded and defined-
benefit pension schemes, informing the public of 
the volatility of investment returns, providing 
detailed information on the actual and 
anticipated effect on benefits for workers of 
different age groups, and describing measures 
such as minimum and/or non-contributory 
pensions to protect the poorest and most 
vulnerable. Such an effort would ideally be 
undertaken in any event in order to improve the 
understanding and financial capability of workers 
that will have beneficial long term effects beyond 
the pension system.  The current crisis can 
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provide the impetus for such an effort and 
creates an ideal opportunity for it to be effective 
as workers are more attentive to financial issues. 
• Establishing a framework for phased or deferred  
annuitization or the alternative of receiving benefits 
through phased withdrawals on reaching retirement age.    
This is important for those funded schemes with 
mandatory annuitization.  As discussed above, 
the individuals most at risk from the rapid 
decline of asset values are those very close to 
retirement who potentially lock in the large 
declines when they convert their savings into an 
annuity. Allowing for phased withdrawals and 
the gradual purchase of annuities can enable 
individuals to realize the effects of an eventual 
recovery by not requiring the liquidation of 
invested assets until their value has some time to 
recover.   
• Considering a limited and time-bound support program 
for the small group retiring in the midst of the crisis that 
will be most affected.  Indeed, there are some, 
primarily, low income workers with lower saving 
levels who might, even under a phased annuity 
purchase or withdrawal program, be required to 
liquidate their diminished accounts in the short 
term.  This group could be assisted through 
programs that a offer a minimum return 
guarantee, analogous to what has been provided 
in the banking system in response to the crisis.  
This help should be accessible only to people 
close to retirement and targeted by level of 
income.  The principle would be to compensate 
individuals facing a major decline in net 
replacement rates.  Such an effort would then be 
phased-out as the recovery reaches certain 
trigger points.  In all cases, however, the 
opportunity costs and distributional effects of 
the public resources involved should be carefully 
assessed. 
• Helping pay-as-you-go systems to remain financial viable 
and protecting the benefits of low-income workers.  As 
suggested above, in many cases the government 
may need to provide additional financing for 
public pension schemes to replace a decline in 
the collection of workers contributions. 
Government could also consider options to 
maximize protection of low income workers 
facing declining salaries by offering flat-rate 
minimum pensions and full indexation of 
benefits.  Any such effort should bear in mind, 
however, that many pay-as-you-go pension 
systems cover only the wealthiest minority of the 
labor force and that such support could come at 
the expense of other more vulnerable groups not 
covered by the formal pension system. 
• Reconsidering the valuation rules applicable to pension 
fund assets in the context of the extreme current volatility 
in financial markets.  There has been a current (and 
largely beneficial trend) toward requirements for 
mark-to-market valuation of the assets of all 
types of financial institutions including pension 
funds.  While this generally increases 
transparency and the value of disclosure there 
may be circumstances, such as the current crisis, 
in which it proves to be counterproductive.  
Regulators and supervisors (as some have 
already done) may consider relaxing these rules 
to smooth presented valuation when extreme 
short term price movements occur.  Some 
smoothing in periods of extreme volatility more 
accurately reflect the true underlying values and 
avoid the possible adverse reactions to large 
changes that prove to be very short term. 
 
Medium-term responses  
The financial crisis provides a strong impetus for all 
countries to review the design and implementation 
of policies to best achieve the core objectives of 
retirement systems. It particularly highlights the 
value of diversification in the overall system design 
and the need to effectively manage the risks 
associated with funded arrangements.  Over the 
medium term, attentions should be given to the 
following issues: 
• Better diversifying the management of financial and other 
macroeconomic risks.  The financial crisis 
strengthens the case for a multi-pillar pension 
system, which can be highly resilient in the face 
of even severe financial and economic 
turbulence.  The multi-pillar system would 
incorporate elements of a well targeted social 
pension or minimum guaranteed benefit (a zero 
pillar) to ensure broad protection against 
poverty; a sustainable earnings based first pillar, 
and funded second pillar.  The three operating 
together would provide core benefits to the 
broad population even during the low points of 
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the economic cycle.  Key questions for 
governments will be: (i) how to set the level of 
the basic pension and its eligibility conditions to; 
and (ii) how to allocate the contribution rate 
between the first pillar (more exposed to labor 
market risks) and second pillars (more exposed 
to financial risks). 
• Improving the management of financial risks.  For 
the funded (second and third) pillars, the crisis 
should prompt renewed attention on the 
importance of well developed risk management 
and governance standards and integrating these 
into the regulation and supervision of pension 
funds.  In addition, mechanisms to better shield 
retirees from the impact of account fluctuations 
immediately before retirement should be 
explored.  These could include the introduction 
of age based/life-cycle portfolios which require 
low and middle income workers to switch part 
of their balances to less risky investments as they 
get closer to retirement.  Default age- and 
earnings-related asset allocations are also 
important in light of the observed inertia of 
contributors.  
• Making pay-as-you-go systems more sustainable, robust 
and secure.  For the first pillar, countries should 
consider the adoption of Notional Defined 
Contribution schemes where benefits are linked 
to contributions and life-expectancy at 
retirement. Ideally, these systems would 
incorporate a reserve fund and an appropriate 
balancing mechanism to adjust to demographic 
and economic developments.  
At the minimum, countries with traditional 
defined-benefit systems should introduce 
changes in benefit formulas and eligibility 
conditions to:  (i) gradually incorporate all 
salaries in the calculation of the pension, with 
past salaries indexed by the growth rate of the 
average covered wage; and (ii) link the 
calculation of the accrual rate to the retirement 
age and the contribution rate.  If these two 
measures are adopted countries can also consider 
the automatic indexation of pensions.   
• Having a well designed zero pillar where affordable and 
justifiable.  A well-designed zero pillar or the 
incorporation of a minimum pension guarantee 
into one of the other pillars can mitigate the 
effects of future economic volatility on the 
vulnerable elderly and lifetime poor.  These 
systems need to be carefully designed to ensure 
their affordability and that they do not have 
negative incentive effects 
• Integrating unemployment savings and insurance options 
into an overall social insurance system.  Pension 
systems can become de facto unemployment 
insurance systems in period of economic 
disruptions as workers losing their jobs seek to 
claim retirement or disability benefits when other 
alternatives are not available.  Some countries 
need to consider stronger restrictions on 
disability claims and early retirement, while 
strengthening the income-protection systems for 
workers who lose their jobs.  Policy options 
include combinations of unemployment 
insurance and unemployment individual savings 
accounts that can be accessed during spells of 
unemployment.  
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Conclusions and recommendations 
 
 The impact of the financial crisis extends beyond 
immediate losses to pension fund assets. 
 Abrupt policy changes in response to the 
immediate circumstances should be avoided. 
Pension systems are designed to function over 
very long time periods.  Short term responses to 
relatively rare circumstances can potentially have 
negative long term consequences on the capacity 
of pension systems to reliably provide adequate 
levels of retirement income. 
 Measures to mitigate the affects on the relatively 
small number of retiring individuals can be 
considered without fundamentally altering the 
system design. 
 The current crisis strengthens the need for 
diversified multi-pillar pension systems that are 
able to manage risks and provide protection to 
individuals who may be vulnerable to the kind of 
economic shocks now being experienced. 
 Increasing attention should be paid to managing 
the exposure of individuals to short term financial 
risks in funded systems through portfolios 
designed for workers nearing retirement age and 
the development of phased transitions to the 
payout of benefits that limit the impact of shorter 
term financial volatility 
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Annex 
Pension systems in Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Country % Wage 
to 
Funded 
Scheme 
Proportion of 
total 
Contribution 
to Funded 
Scheme 
Year 
Funded 
Scheme
Started 
Participation in Funded 
Scheme 
Year Funded Participants Retire 
Bulgaria 5% 21.7% 2002 Mandatory <42 Full cohorts in 2023 
Croatia 5% 25.0% 2002 Mandatory <40, Voluntary 40-
50 
Partial cohorts of women by 2008 and of men by 
2013; full cohorts of women by 2022 and of men 
by 2027 
Estonia 6% 20.0% 2002 Voluntary Partial cohorts by 2012 
Hungary 8% 23.9% 1998 Mandatory new entrants; 
voluntary for all others 
Partial cohorts by 2008; full cohorts by 2035 
Kazakhstan 10% 100.0% 1998 Mandatory for all Full cohorts by 1999 but acquired rights in old 
system in addition 
Kosovo 10% 100.0% 2002 Mandatory for <55 Full cohorts by 2012 
Latvia 8% 24.0% 2001 Mandatory <30, Voluntary 30-
50 
Partial cohorts by 2013; full cohorts by 2033 
Lithuania 5.5% 22.0% 2004 Voluntary Partial cohorts by 2014 
Macedonia 7.42% 35.0% 2006 Mandatory for new entrants Partial cohorts by 2016; full cohorts of women by 
2043 and of men by 2045 
Poland 7.3% 26.1% 1999 Mandatory <30; Voluntary 30-
50 
Partial cohorts of women by 2009 and of men by 
2014; full cohorts of women by 2029 and of men 
by 2034 
Romania 2%, 
increasing 
to 6% 
6.7% 2008 Mandatory <35; voluntary 36-
45 
Partial cohorts of women by 2023 and of men by 
2028; full cohorts of women by 2033 and of men 
by 2038 
Russia 6% 30.0% 2002 Mandatory for <35 Full cohorts of women by 2022 and of men by 
2027 
Slovak 
Republic 
9% 31.3% 2005 Voluntary for all Partial cohorts by 2015 
Source:  Regional Bank Staff 
 
 
 
Pension systems in Latin America and the Caribbean 
National Scheme  Contribution Rates (Main system)   
Includes funded 
scheme? 
"True 
Multipillar"(1)
Employee Employer Self 
Employed
% of 
contributions to 
funded 
scheme 
% of workers 
in funded 
scheme 
Bolivia Yes No 12.2% 0.0% 12.20% 100.0% 100.0% 
Brazil No -- 8-11% 20.0% 20.00% -- -- 
Chile Yes No 12.5% 0.0%  100.0% 96.0% 
Colombia Yes No 7.8% 23.3% 31.00% 50.0% 56.0% 
Costa Rica Yes Yes 2.5% 4.8%  0.0% 100.0% 
Ecuador No -- 6-9% 1-3% 6.60% -- -- 
El Salvador Yes No 6.0% 7.0%  100.0% 98.0% 
Guatemala No -- 1.8% 3.7% 5.50% -- -- 
Haiti No -- 6.0% 6.0%  -- -- 
Honduras No -- 1.0% 2.0%  -- -- 
México Yes No 2.7% 6.3% 9.00% 72.2% 100.0% 
Nicaragua No -- 6.3% 15.0%  -- -- 
Panamá Yes Yes 7.5% 3.5% 11.00% 68.2% n/a 
Paraguay No -- 9.0% 14.0%  -- -- 
Peru Yes No 13.0% 0.0%  100.0% 72.0% 
Rep. Dominican Yes No 2.9% 7.1%  100.0% 93.5% 
Uruguay Yes Yes 15.0% 7.5% 15.00% 50.0% 43.0% 
Venezuela No -- 1.9% 4.8%  -- -- 
1/ Workers in the funded scheme also participate in a pay-as-you-go pillar. 
Source:  Regional Bank Staff based on Mesa Lago (2008), FIAP (2008), and Goldschmit (2008).  
